Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers by Morrison, Angela D.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2017
Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement, and
Exploited Immigrant Workers
Angela D. Morrison
Texas A&M University School of Law, angela.morrison@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Agency Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Immigration
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Angela D. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 295 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/814
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\11-1\HLP102.txt unknown Seq: 1  2-FEB-17 13:48
Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement,
and Exploited Immigrant Workers
Angela D. Morrison*
INTRODUCTION
Unauthorized workers in abusive workplaces have found themselves in
a tug-of-war between federal agencies that seek to protect the workers under
federal workplace laws on the one hand, and federal agencies that seek to
prosecute or deport the workers on the other hand. Federal law contains a
host of workplace protections designed to prohibit workplace abuses and to
protect workers.1 The protections extend not only to citizens and workers
with employment authorization but also to unauthorized workers.2 More-
over, Congress has recognized the vulnerability of unauthorized workers by
providing, through statute, a means for exploited workers who lack federal
employment authorization to obtain employment authorization and immigra-
tion status.3
Nonetheless, federal prosecutors and immigration judges in the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) and trial attorneys with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), a division within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), have acted in contravention of congressional intent and other execu-
tive agencies that provide protections to exploited workers. Workers have
been swept up in ICE immigration raids of abusive employers and then pros-
ecuted or placed in removal proceedings.4 Workers who have obtained law
* Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thanks to participants in the
Emerging Immigration Law Scholars and Teachers Conference at the University of California,
Irvine, for their comments on an early draft of this paper. I also thank the faculty at the Wil-
liam S. Boyd School of Law (UNLV), including Anne Traum, Leslie Griffin, Eric Franklin,
Lydia Nussbaum, Ruben Garcia, Jeff Stempel, Jean Sternlight, and Ann McGinley, for their
comments on the paper. Professors Michael Green and Fatma Marouf at Texas A&M Univer-
sity School of Law also provided helpful comments. Of course, any errors are my own.
1 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq. (2012); Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2016). For further discus-
sion of these statutes, see infra Part II. See also Kati L. Griffith, Discovering Immployment
Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 389 (2011) (demonstrating that Congress has repeatedly intended to provide broad
protections to workers through federal employment regulation); Leticia Saucedo, A New “U”:
Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 894 n.17
(2008) [hereinafter Saucedo, A New “U”] (describing post-Hoffman decisions in which fed-
eral workplace protections were extended to unauthorized workers).
2 See discussion infra notes 77–80, 84–101 and accompanying text.
3 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28, 42, and 44 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter TVPA of 2000].
4 See, e.g., Rebecca Smith et al., Iced Out: How Immigration Enforcement Has Interfered
with Workers’ Rights, AFL-CIO (2009), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/laborunions/29
[https://perma.cc/SYC4-9VEV] (describing instances in which workers reported workplace
violations and then were put into removal proceedings by ICE); Workers on the Front Lines,
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enforcement certificates that attest they are victims of crimes still have faced
immigration judges and ICE trial attorneys who have denied the workers’
requests to terminate proceedings, administratively close their removal
cases, or continue their cases.5 Still other workers who have come forward
on their own to report workplace violations have been turned over for crimi-
nal prosecution or placed in removal proceedings, even though there is
ongoing civil litigation with respect to their employers’ workplace practices.6
Other scholars have examined the incongruity of treating workers as
both victims and criminals and have proposed solutions focusing on changes
in law or policy related to the inconsistent treatment. Stephen Lee has cor-
rectly identified the asymmetry in enforcement power between the Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) and ICE as a contributing factor in the DOL’s failure
to protect unauthorized workers.7 He proposes a policy change to empower
DOL to monitor ICE’s workplace enforcement efforts.8 Leticia Saucedo sug-
gests amending federal criminal law and strengthening the federal law pro-
viding immigration status to certain victims of crimes.9
My proposal adds to the discussion in two ways. First, it explains the
doctrinal basis for treating unauthorized workers as victims rather than per-
petrators, thereby supporting proposed changes to policy and law. Second, it
proposes solutions based on equitable concepts in current law—
prosecutorial discretion and estoppel—for individual workers in the absence
of any changes to law or policy.
This article begins by explaining and providing context about the rise in
the prosecution of exploited workers in Part I. In Part II, I demonstrate that
Congress manifested a clear intent to protect, not prosecute, exploited work-
ers through four statutory schemes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA), and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000. Part III addresses potential solutions for workers who find themselves
caught up in ICE or DOJ prosecutions after reporting abusive workplaces.
POWER CAMPAIGN, http://thepoweract.org/worker-stories [https://perma.cc/Y9FV-P7YU]
(describing workers who have been caught up in ICE raids of abusive employers and then
placed in removal proceedings).
5 See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, INFONET DOC. NO. 11110947, HOLDING
DHS ACCOUNTABLE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2011) (collecting cases where ICE did
not exercise prosecutorial discretion including cases where noncitizen had a law enforcement
certificate, certifying eligibility for a U visa).
6 See, e.g., EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO & REBECCA SMITH, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORK-
ERS RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION AND ADVANCE LA-
BOR RIGHTS, CAL. REPORT (2013) (collecting case stories of workers who reported workplace
violations under various federal employment laws and were placed in removal proceedings or
criminally prosecuted).
7 See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089,
1100–01 (2011).
8 Id. at 1113–16.
9 See Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Enforcement:
The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303,
317 (2010) [hereinafter Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment
Enforcement].
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The equitable exercise of prosecutorial discretion could help workers who
have no affirmative relief under current law successfully avoid the most seri-
ous consequences of criminal prosecution or deportation. Furthermore, for
workers who have received a certification from a federal agency like the
DOL or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) finding
they are victims of qualifying criminal activity and cooperated with law en-
forcement in the investigation or prosecution of the crime, I outline a new
type of estoppel—executive estoppel—that may prevent their continued
prosecution or removal proceeding. Finally, I conclude with thoughts about
how these principles can apply more broadly outside the area of immigration
and workplace law.
I. FERTILE GROUND FOR EXPLOITATION
The combination of tighter border controls, limited options for status
regularization, and increased prosecutions of noncitizens for status-related
crimes has left workers without work authorization increasingly vulnerable
to employer exploitation. Over the last thirty years, Congress has passed
increasingly tighter border controls while at the same time limiting the op-
tions for legal migration.10 The past decade also has seen a precipitous rise in
the federal prosecution of noncitizens for immigration status-related
crimes.11 Moreover, as Jennifer Chaco´n has noted, the way in which these
crimes have been prosecuted and the narrative that has developed around
them has meant that undocumented workers have been mistakenly identified
as the “criminal alien.”12 Gender and racial stereotypes regarding who is a
victim and who is a criminal also play into the narrative.13 That many work-
10 See Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 415
(2011).
11 Criminal immigration convictions have risen by 121% as compared to ten years ago and
1144% as compared to twenty years ago, despite a decrease in convictions over the last two
years. See TRAC IMMIGRATION, Criminal Immigration Convictions Drop 20 Percent, TRANS-
ACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 12, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/392 [https://perma.cc/3UA2-597Y].
12 Jennifer Chaco´n, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of
Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1628–36 (2010). Fatma E. Marouf has
pointed out the inaccuracy and the problematic deployment of terms such as “criminal alien”
and “illegal alien.” See Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the
Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 155 (2012) (arguing that new policies
on prosecutorial discretion may “lead to grouping those with any kind of conviction into a
category called ‘criminals,’ ignoring how undocumented immigrants are uniquely vulnerable to
certain kinds of criminal charges based on both their lack of legal status or their ethnicity or
race”); Fatma Marouf, No Human Being Is “Illegal,” L.V. REV. J. (June 22, 2012), http://www
.reviewjournal.com/opinion/no-human-being-illegal [https://perma.cc/JA8D-CZ8Z] (pointing
out that the term “illegal alien” is inaccurate grammatically because “illegal” describes acts,
not people, and is inaccurate as a legal matter since the term inaccurately assumes lack of
immigration status is a criminal violation).
13 See Kim, supra note 10, at 445 (describing the “discriminatory preferences for the
‘innocent’ victim, who also happens to be female and passive, rather than the ‘criminal’ alien,
who is often male, assertive, and brown”).
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ers enter into the employment relationship voluntarily and often provide the
false documentation themselves leads to an inaccurate perception that both
the unauthorized workers and the employer stand to gain by deliberately
flouting immigration laws.14 Yet, even when the employer subjects these
workers to an abusive environment and the employment arrangement be-
comes coercive, the workplace abuses are ignored and the workers are seen
“as illegal aliens first and foremost, subject to deportation.”15
The ongoing criminal and immigration prosecution of unauthorized
workers also involves federal agencies with virtually unfettered discretion in
decisions about whom to prosecute.16 It takes place in a criminal court sys-
tem in which most prosecutions end in a plea bargain.17 In the immigration
context, it takes place in a court system that provides truncated due process
rights, assuming the noncitizen even gets an immigration hearing.18 Further-
more, immigration policing remains “one of the few areas where the courts
and the executive branch continue to expressly sanction the use of racial
profiling.”19 These conditions—the inaccurate stereotype of the “criminal
alien,” the increased prosecution of immigration status crimes, and unfet-
tered discretion—have left unauthorized workers particularly vulnerable to
workplace exploitation.
Although the large-scale worksite enforcement actions of the first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century and their attendant prosecutions of workers
for identity theft20 and en masse criminal proceedings21 have declined, there
are several indications DHS has focused on prosecuting workers instead of
employers.22 For example, in March 2013, the type of immigration crime
“showing the greatest increase in prosecutions—up twenty percent—com-
pared to one year ago was Title 18 U.S.C Section 1028 that involves
14 See id.
15 Id.
16 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1291–93
(2010).
17 See Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 909–11 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow I].
18 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal
and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 485–92 (2013) (providing an
overview of the lack of resources and lack of due process afforded in immigration
proceedings).
19 Jennifer M. Chaco´n, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY
B. RTS. J. 577, 606 (2012).
20 See, e.g., Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The Postville Raid and the Misinterpre-
tation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2009) (arguing that federal
prosecutors incorrectly charged workers with violating the federal statute providing for the
prosecution of aggravated identity theft). Moyers was proved correct in his interpretation when
the Supreme Court decided Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
21 See Moyers, supra note 20, at 675–76.
22 See Taking Action on Immigration: Strengthening Enforcement, WHITE HOUSE, www
.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/strengthening-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ZR7U-
V86G] (last accessed Jan. 11, 2017).
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‘[f]raud and related activity—id documents.’” 23 DHS referred one hundred
percent of those prosecutions.24
Moreover, ICE’s webpage addressing worksite enforcement still em-
ploys terminology that demonstrates a view of unauthorized workers as
criminal. In ICE’s description of its efforts to target “abusive or exploitative
employers,” ICE argues that “[b]y uncovering such violations, ICE can
send a strong deterrent message to other employers who knowingly employ
illegal aliens.” 25 That ICE still views such workers as “illegal” rather than
individuals worthy of protection is further demonstrated by its lopsided en-
forcement efforts. On its website, ICE announces it “made 452 criminal ar-
rests tied to worksite enforcement investigations.”26 Yet less than forty
percent of those arrests—179—were of owners or management level em-
ployees.27 In addressing the harm in employing unauthorized workers, ICE
writes, “Illegal aliens often turn to criminal activity, including document
fraud, Social Security fraud or identify theft to obtain employment. It can
take years for identity theft victims to repair the damage.”28 Rather than
addressing the harm to the workers, ICE casts unauthorized workers as
criminals. To the extent that ICE talks about harms to the community, it
argues that innocent businesses are the real victims of exploitative employ-
ers: “Responsible employers who conduct their business lawfully are put at
an unfair disadvantage when they try to compete with unscrupulous busi-
nesses. The unscrupulous businesses may gain a competitive edge by not
paying their unauthorized workers prevailing wages and benefits.”29
Indeed, Saucedo has explained the impact of workplace-focused en-
forcement efforts on individual workers: “ICE acknowledges it will continue
to enforce removals of workers caught up in their investigations of employer
violations. Even though the [Obama administration] portrays deportations
as incidental consequences of its focus on employers, thousands of workers
have been affected.”30
And there is reason to believe that more workers will be affected with
the recent change in administration. Throughout his 2016 presidential cam-
paign, Donald Trump vowed to deport millions of unauthorized immi-
23 TRAC IMMIGRATION, Immigration Prosecutions for March 2013, TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (May 9, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/im-
migration/monthlymar13/fil/ [https://perma.cc/Q93F-CCRY].
24 Id.
25 Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, www.ice.gov/worksite/ [https:/
/perma.cc/UP2E-4YHQ] (emphasis added).
26 Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (April 1, 2013), https://
www.ice.gov/factsheets/worksite [https://perma.cc/AM5Y-GKYS].
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Enforcement, supra note 9, at
308.
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grants.31 Two of the ten points in Trump’s immigration plan focus on
reducing the number of unauthorized and authorized immigrant workers in
the United States.32 Trump also plans to “immediately terminate President
Obama’s” deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) and the currently
enjoined deferred action for parents of Americans and legal residents pro-
grams (DAPA).33 Once Trump terminates those programs, the over 1.2 mil-
lion individuals who currently have work authorization due to DACA34 will
be stripped of their ability to work with authorization. That leaves many
more workers at risk of removal due to investigations into employer viola-
tions of federal immigration law.
When federal prosecutors within the DOJ and DHS seek to prosecute or
deport workers who come forward to report employers for violating federal
workplace laws, they exhibit a similar failure to recognize the worker as a
victim of exploitation. The result has been the criminal prosecution of unau-
thorized workers for offenses such as identity theft, false use of a social
security number, and other document fraud offenses based on the workers’
use of false documents to obtain employment.35
To illustrate the impact workforce-based immigration enforcement has
on individual workers’ ability to enforce their workplace rights, imagine two
different workplace scenarios involving unauthorized workers. In the first,
imagine a chicken-processing plant in Iowa. The work is dangerous, dirty,
and does not require specialized skills to complete. To maintain adequate
profit margins, the company pays the lowest possible wages to its workers
and does not provide many benefits. Over the years, the company has hired
monolingual Spanish speakers from a particular region in Guatemala to
work on the kill floor. The company’s human resources department does not
inquire too closely into the workers’ immigration status beyond collecting
the documents the employer must verify for the required DHS form. None-
theless, it is common knowledge throughout the company that almost all of
31 Amy B. Wang, Donald Trump Plans to Immediately Deport 2 Million to 3 Million
Undocumented Immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/13/donald-trump-plans-to-immediately-deport-2-to-3-million-undoc
umented-immigrants/?utm_term=.3e95a3d490d7 [https://perma.cc/4Q7W-P33Q].
32 The 10 Point Plan includes the following points: “Turn off the jobs and benefits magnet.
Many immigrants come to the U.S. illegally in search of jobs, even though federal law prohib-
its the employment of illegal immigrants. . . .  Reform legal immigration to serve the best
interests of America and its workers, keeping immigration levels within historic norms.” Im-
migration, TRUMP/PENCE, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/immigration [https://perma
.cc/REU7-88PE].
33 Id.
34 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NUMBER OF I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF DE-
FERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, INTAKE, BIOMETRICS
AND CASE STATUS: 2012-2016 (JUN. 30) (Sep. 13, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20
Form%20Types/DACA/daca_performancedata_fy2016_qtr3.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UR9-WSG
Y].
35 Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Enforcement, supra note 9, at
308–09.
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the Guatemalan workers are, in fact, working without any sort of immigra-
tion authorization.
Although the workers labor for ten to twelve hours a day, the employer
pays them for only eight hours. When one of the workers complains to
human resources about the underpayment, the human resources manager
tells him, “If you report this to anyone, they will have to ask you about your
immigration papers. That might cause some problems for you, and you could
end up getting deported.” Word quickly spreads throughout the plant that
anyone who reports the wage theft to government authorities will get de-
ported. Finally, one worker, Gustavo, musters up his courage and files a
complaint with the DOL and a suit against the employer for violating the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Once the employer finds out about the suit, the
employer calls ICE and reports that Gustavo is currently working without
authorization. ICE arrests Gustavo and places him in removal proceedings.
A second type of scenario can arise in which a worker receives an ini-
tial certification from one federal agency that she qualifies for a visa based
on being the victim of a workplace crime but is criminally prosecuted by
DOJ or put in removal proceedings by ICE because she obtained work using
false identification documents.36
A typical scenario could play out like this: Ulu works in a restaurant as
a server, is unauthorized, and used fraudulent documents to obtain work.
One of the supervisors at the restaurant begins to sexually harass the female
workers. He propositions them repeatedly and calls them demeaning names.
The supervisor forces some of the women, including Ulu, to go into an of-
fice with him and he rapes them.37 After each rape, the supervisor threatens
the women and tells them that if any of them reports him, “you will be
thrown in jail for being illegal.” Ulu becomes part of an EEOC investigation
into a Title VII hostile work environment at the restaurant. Because of the
rape and Ulu’s cooperation with the investigation, the EEOC certifies her as
a victim of a qualifying workplace crime which certification she submits to
USCIS to obtain a U visa.38 Before her U visa is processed by USCIS, the
36 See id. (describing federal criminal prosecutions of workers for identity theft and other
status offenses after a workplace raid or reporting a workplace violation).
37 See, e.g., Rape on the Night Shift (PBS Frontline 2015) (documenting sexual assaults of
female, immigrant custodial workers by shift supervisors).
38 Victims of certain crimes who lack immigration status may apply for a visa that allows
them to live and work in the United States for a period of four years. Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012 & Supp. I 2014). Among
the list of qualifying crimes are crimes which may occur in the workplace such as “rape; . . .
trafficking; . . . sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; . . . sexual exploitation; . . . peonage;
involuntary servitude; . . . unlawful criminal restraint; . . . felonious assault; . . . obstruction of
justice; . . . fraud in foreign labor contracting . . . .” § 101(a)(U)(iii), § 1101(a)(U)(iii) (Supp.
2013–14). A law enforcement agency must certify that the noncitizen was a victim of the
crime, “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful  . . . [to the agency]
investigating or prosecuting” the crime. § 101(a)(U)(i)(III), § 1101(a)(U)(i)(III) (2012). The
regulations define “certifying agencies” and specifically include the EEOC and the DOL. 8
C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2016). One of the most important benefits of the U visa is that it allows
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employer reports Ulu to ICE for document fraud. In turn, ICE refers Ulu to
DOJ for prosecution.
Thus, Gustavo and Ulu are both victims of workplace exploitation and
criminal or immigration defendants. Someone like Ulu who was raped in the
workplace could apply for a U visa; someone like Gustavo would not qualify
because he suffered mere wage theft. Even workers like Ulu, who qualify for
immigration relief, are still subject to removal for being unauthorized or sub-
ject to criminal prosecution for using fraudulent identity documents.39 Gus-
tavo has no path to lawful immigration status while Ulu is on her way but
faces barriers due to her prosecution. Because congressional intent is to pro-
tect, not prosecute, workers like Gustavo and Ulu, both should be able to
draw on equitable concepts for protection from the harshest consequences of
prosecution.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO PROTECT, NOT PROSECUTE,
EXPLOITED WORKERS
Congress has expressed a clear intent to protect, not prosecute, victims
of workplace abuses. Four statutory schemes express this intent: the federal
anti-discrimination statutes as exemplified in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,40 the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),41 the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act (IRCA),42 and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).43 Together these acts protect victims of
workplace abuses and illustrate congressional intent to protect those workers
in three ways. First, Congress intended to hold employers accountable for
violations of federal workplace laws. Second, to ensure employer accounta-
bility, Congress intended to encourage employees who have suffered abuses
to come forward and report their employers. Finally, while IRCA by itself
may suggest that Congress intended that unauthorized workers ultimately be
deported, as discussed below, through the subsequent passage of the TVPA
a noncitizen to adjust her status to that of permanent legal resident after three years. INA
§ 245(m)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(1)(A) (2012).
39 See infra Part II.D.
40 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with majority decision and noting the Court has “long recognized that our
interpretations of Title VII’s language apply ‘with equal force in the context of age discrimina-
tion, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA, were derived in haec verba from Title VII’”
(quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985))); Carparts Distrib.
Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the court
looks to Title VII for guidance in interpreting the ADA); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co.,
984 F. Supp. 891, 913 n.17 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that because of the similarities in the
definition of “employer” in the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII, case law interpreting any of those
statutes is relevant); West v. Russell Corp., 868 F. Supp. 313, 317 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (applying
a Title VII framework to analyze an ADA claim of discrimination).
41 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–62 (2012).
42 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (2012).
43 TVPA of 2000.
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and related legislation, Congress intended to protect workers who have suf-
fered egregious workplace abuses from deportation.
However, the prosecution of workers who have reported violations of
workplace protections undermines these congressional purposes. It discour-
ages employees from coming forward, it incentivizes employers to create
exploitable workforces so they can evade liability under federal labor and
employment laws, and it puts obstacles in the path of workers who could
regularize their immigration status.
A. Congress Intended to Hold Employers Accountable for Violations
of Federal Workplace Laws
Both Title VII and the FLSA hold employers accountable by allowing
victims of discrimination, wage theft, or retaliation to bring civil suits
against their employers.44 Title VII prohibits employers from failing to hire
an applicant, discharging an employee, or discriminating against an em-
ployee with respect to the terms, pay, or conditions of employment because
of the applicant or employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.45
The FLSA requires that employers pay a minimum wage to employees,46
prohibits employers from paying different wages based on sex,47 and limits
the number of hours employers can require employees to work during the
week without overtime pay.48 Both statutory schemes include a range of
remedies with the specific goals of deterring employers from violating work-
ers’ rights and holding employers accountable when they discriminate or en-
gage in wage theft.49
Courts have explained that Title VII depends primarily on individual
workers to judicially enforce it.50 Section 706 of Title VII authorizes individ-
uals to bring a suit alleging unlawful discrimination.51 Indeed, the Court reg-
ularly has noted that Congress counted on individual workers to enforce
Title VII’s provisions as private attorneys general to not only vindicate their
44 See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (providing for a private right of action for employ-
ment discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (providing for a private right of action under
the FLSA).
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
46 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 2016).
47 See id.
48 See id. § 207 (Westlaw) (also containing prohibitions on child labor); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 212 (West 2016).
49 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West 2016) (explaining Title VII
remedies); 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (Westlaw) (explaining FLSA remedies).
50 See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 45 (1974)).
51 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706(f)(1), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (2012).
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own injuries “but also [to] vindicate[ ] the important congressional policy
against discriminatory employment practices.”52
The remedies those private attorneys general may seek add teeth to the
enforcement scheme and demonstrate congressional desire to hold employ-
ers accountable. Initially, Title VII allowed plaintiffs to recover only equita-
ble remedies such as back pay and injunctive relief.53 Nonetheless, Congress
intended these remedies to allow courts to fashion relief that would make
victims whole and hold employers accountable:
The provisions of this subsection [706(g)—addressing relief] are
intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equita-
ble powers to fashion the most complete relief possible . . . . [T]he
scope of relief . . . is intended to make the victims of unlawful
discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective
rests not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful em-
ployment practice complained of, but also requires that persons
aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful em-
ployment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position
where they would have been if not for the unlawful
discrimination.54
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991,55 Congress amended Title VII’s
remedial provisions and provided a means for litigants to recover not only
equitable remedies but also compensatory and punitive damages.56 The Act
contained limitations on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages
that each claimant may recover, which ranges from fifty thousand to three
hundred thousand dollars, depending on the size of the employer.57 Impor-
52 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45. See generally Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retalia-
tion, Threats, and the Silencing of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 782–85
(2013) [hereinafter Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation].
53 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259.
54 Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 118 CONG. REC.
7539, 7565 (1972).
55 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West 2012). The Act provides for
recovery by complaining individuals for intentional discrimination:
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional dis-
crimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act, and provided that the
complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining
party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed under subsection
(b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(1).
56 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(1). Compensatory damages include “future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and
other nonpecuniary losses.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
57 See id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D) (limiting damages to $50,000 for employers with more
than fourteen but fewer than 101 employees, $100,000 for employers who have more than 100
but fewer than 201 employees, $200,000 for employers who have more than 200 but fewer
than 501 employees, and $300,000 for employers who have more than 500 employees).
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tantly, because litigants could now seek non-equitable remedies, the Act also
provided for a jury trial.58
One of the main goals of Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was to expand the remedies available to victims of intentional discrimi-
nation. In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made findings
regarding the reasons underlying the Act:
The Congress finds that—
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter un-
lawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
. . . and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections
against unlawful discrimination in employment.59
It also listed the need for additional remedies as one of the purposes for the
Act:
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace; . . . and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by ex-
panding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to pro-
vide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.60
These findings and purposes show that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
meant to provide more remedies to victims of discrimination and expand the
coverage of Title VII. Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, the reme-
dies were “designed to punish employers who engage in unlawful discrimi-
natory acts, and to deter future discrimination both by the defendant and by
all other employers.”61 The protections apply not only to citizen workers,
but, as discussed below, also to noncitizen workers.
58 “If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section—
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and (2) the court shall not inform the jury of the
limitation described in subsection (b)(3) of this section.” Id. § 1981a(c). When Congress
amended Title VII in 1972, Senator Ervin of North Carolina proposed an amendment that
would have provided for jury trial even though only equitable remedies were available at the
time: “Upon demand of any party, the issues of fact arising in any civil action brought under
the provisions of this Act or the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be
determined by a jury.” 118 CONG. REC. 4829, 4919 (1972).
The amendment failed. 118 CONG. REC. at 4920 (fifty-six against, thirty for, and fourteen
abstentions). Senator Ervin’s stated purpose in proposing the amendment was “to make certain
that litigants who are summoned under this act to the Federal courts shall have the right to
demand a trial by jury on the issues of fact, and to make certain that there shall be citizen
participation in the enforcement of the provisions of this bill.” 118 CONG. REC. at 4920.
59 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, § 105 Stat. 1071, sec. 2.
60 Id. at sec. 3.
61 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004).
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The FLSA also relies on workers for its effective enforcement.62 Sec-
tion 216 of the FLSA provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability
prescribed in [the Act] may be maintained against any employer (including
a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated.”63 It too provides strong remedial re-
lief.64 Accordingly, Congress designed Title VII and FLSA enforcement
schemes that created private attorneys general who could seek broad reme-
dies in order to hold employers accountable.
IRCA likewise focuses on employer accountability.65 IRCA, similar to
Title VII and the FLSA, allows individual suits for violations of its retalia-
tion and discrimination provisions.66 And, while individuals cannot sue em-
ployers who hire unauthorized employees, the DOJ can seek both criminal
and civil penalties against such employers.67 IRCA prohibits employers from
hiring unauthorized workers,68 makes it unlawful for employers to discrimi-
nate against authorized workers on the basis of national origin and citizen-
ship status,69 and proscribes employers from engaging in document
discrimination.70 It also contains retaliation provisions.71 IRCA’s provisions,
however, should not be read as an invitation for employers to exploit unau-
thorized workers.72 Instead, IRCA stands for the proposition that Congress
intended to hold employers accountable. Allowing employers to get around
the accountability by deporting their way out of the problem undermines that
accountability.
62 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333–34
(2011). See generally Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, supra note 52, at 782–85.
63 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
64 See id. (providing for legal damages for the recovery of employees’ “unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages” for violations of the FLSA’s wage and hour provisions, and
providing for “legal or equitable relief . . . including without limitation employment, reinstate-
ment, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages” for violations of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA).
65 Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
66 See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2012).
67 See INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
68 See id.
69 See INA § 274B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1).
70 See INA § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6) (explaining that an employer’s “request
. . . for more or different documents than are required under [8 U.S.C. § 1324a] or refusing to
honor documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine shall be treated
as an unfair immigration-related practice if made for the purpose or with the intent of discrimi-
nating against an individual [on the basis of their national origin]”).
71 See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. IRCA prohibits discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin and citizenship status, bars retaliation and intimidation against employees who
file a complaint, and proscribes employers from requesting different documentation or docu-
mentation beyond that required under IRCA. See INA § 274B(a)(1), (5), (6), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(1), (5), (6).
72 See infra notes 84–101 and accompanying text.
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Congress intended IRCA to “control illegal immigration to the U.S.”73
One of the primary ways that Congress chose to do so was through employ-
ment provisions that sought to diminish employment as a “magnet that at-
tracts aliens here illegally.”74 IRCA imposes civil and criminal penalties on
employers who “knowingly” hire workers who lack employment authoriza-
tion.75 Employers who violate IRCA’s provisions are subject to civil and
even criminal penalties.76 Thus, just as Congress did with Title VII and the
FLSA, Congress designed an enforcement scheme in IRCA that focuses on
employer accountability.
Similarly, while not making it unlawful for employees to work without
authorization, IRCA includes provisions imposing civil fines, immigration-
related consequences like removal, or criminal penalties on individuals who
use fraudulent documentation to obtain work.77 Also, unauthorized workers
are not defined as “protected individuals” under the Act and may not seek
recourse under IRCA’s anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination provisions.78
The Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB empha-
sized these two provisions in determining that an unauthorized worker who
committed document fraud to obtain employment could not avail himself of
back pay under the National Labor Relations Act.79
At first glance, the Court’s decision seems to undermine an argument of
strong congressional intent to hold employers accountable for workplace vi-
olations of Title VII or the FLSA when the victim is an unauthorized immi-
grant. Nonetheless, there are several reasons to believe that Congress still
intended to hold employers accountable. First, the House Committee Report
73 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. I, at 45 (1986).
74 Id. at 46.
75 INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. To ensure that employers do not “knowing[ly]” hire
unauthorized workers, IRCA has an employment verification system that requires employers
to check the employee’s government-issued identity documents to verify the employee’s au-
thorized status. See INA § 274A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
76 Among the penalties for employers who “knowing[ly]” hire unauthorized workers are:
(1) civil penalties ranging from up to two thousand dollars for a first time violation to up to ten
thousand dollars for three or more violations, and (2) criminal penalties ranging from a fine of
up to three thousand dollars per unauthorized worker to a misdemeanor conviction carrying six
months in jail for “a pattern or practice of violations.” INA § 274A(e)–(g), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(e)–(g). Employers who engage in document discrimination, retaliation, or national
origin discrimination are subject to fines, INA § 274B(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2), and an
award of attorney’s fees, INA § 274B(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(h). Because IRCA only protects
authorized workers, as discussed infra, IRCA’s remedies for retaliation and discrimination do
not evince the same congressional intent to provide broad protection as those of Title VII and
the FLSA.
77 See INA § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c. Under IRCA, it is a federal crime for a person to
use an identification document that she knows is false to obtain employment, or to falsely
attest that she is authorized to work in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). The criminal
penalties include up to five years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b).
78 INA § 274B(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3). IRCA includes the following within the def-
inition of protected individuals: a citizen or national of the United States, a nonimmigrant with
work authorization, refugees/asylees, and legal permanent residents, unless they failed to apply
for naturalization within six months of being eligible or applied on a timely basis but have not
been naturalized within two years after the date of application. See id.
79 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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on IRCA stated the committee did not intend for IRCA to undermine protec-
tions under existing workplace laws:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions
provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way
labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal
or state labor relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor
arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocu-
mented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies
or for engaging in activities protected by existing law.80
Two other aspects of IRCA’s legislative history also demonstrate con-
gressional intent to hold employers accountable for violations of workplace
laws, even when the worker is unauthorized.81 First, when Congress enacted
IRCA, it also increased funding of the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division for
additional enforcement of the FLSA’s overtime regulations.82 By strengthen-
ing enforcement of the FLSA while at the same time creating penalties for
hiring unauthorized workers, Congress sent a message to employers to “pay
the price either through IRCA penalties or wage enforcement actions
brought on behalf of unauthorized workers.”83
80 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. I, at 58 (1986).
81 See, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, Undocumented Workers and Concepts of Fault: Are
Courts Engaged in Legitimate Decisionmaking?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 389, 398–99 (2012); Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1361, 1374–75 (2009) (discussing the legislative history of IRCA).
82 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1374–75 (citing IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 111(d)).
83 Id. at 1375. In his critique of Cunningham-Parmeter’s view that limiting the remedial
rights of unauthorized workers will harm the workers, Eric Posner reinforces this point (i.e.,
that the message Congress sent to employers through IRCA and the FLSA amendments was to
comply or face civil and criminal penalties). Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of
Immigration Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 309 (2013). Posner correctly asserts that “employ-
ers do not share the government’s interests in excluding foreign workers, and still less the
government’s interest in workplace safety. Delegation to employers thus inevitably leads to
perverse outcomes unless the government modifies employers’ incentives.” Id. However, Pos-
ner’s argument that recognizing labor and other workplace rights for unauthorized workers is
not necessarily the solution to the problem ignores the underlying policies of federal work-
place laws and IRCA. As he notes, increasing workplace protections would make unauthorized
workers less appealing to employers because employing them would cost more and encourage
“whistle-blowing or facilitat[e] unionization,” which would result in reduced employer de-
mand for unauthorized workers, thereby harming the workers and U.S. consumers. Id. at
309–10. This is problematic, he concludes, because it is “in tension with the traditional illegal
immigration system, which provides work and potentially a path to citizenship to unskilled
foreign workers with no attachment to this country.” Id. at 310.
The observation that U.S. immigration policy has historically favored looking the other way
when it comes to unauthorized workers in order to reap economic benefits is not inaccurate.
See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 31 (2014) (noting that “the
US [sic] economy has long had a nearly insatiable desire for a flexible, pliant, and inexpen-
sive labor force supplied by immigration, including unauthorized migrants”). Posner’s conclu-
sion fails, however, to recognize the purpose of IRCA, which was to deter employers from
employing unauthorized workers. It was precisely the draw of an exploitable workforce for
employers that the statutory scheme sought to interrupt. Moreover, as discussed in this section,
it ignores the relationship between IRCA and the federal workplace laws.
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Second, when Congress enacted IRCA’s anti-discrimination provisions
it implicitly endorsed the notion that Title VII’s protections extend to unau-
thorized workers. Congress expressed concern that IRCA’s other provisions
would mean that employers would discriminate against employees who were
“foreign-looking” or “foreign-sounding” and so included anti-retaliation
and anti-discrimination provisions.84 Significantly, although Congress chose
not to include unauthorized workers within IRCA’s protections,85 it has done
nothing to exclude such workers from Title VII. Furthermore, IRCA states it
has “no effect on EEOC authority.”86 Accordingly, Congress impliedly did
not intend for IRCA to diminish Title VII’s protections.87
Besides IRCA’s legislative history, the Hoffman decision itself and
post-Hoffman decisions similarly demonstrate that Congress wanted employ-
ers held accountable when they violate the workplace rights of unauthorized
workers. The Hoffman Court made clear that IRCA did not erase the em-
ployer accountability embodied in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The Court noted that even though an unauthorized employee could
not seek back pay as a remedy that “does not mean that the employer gets
off scot-free [for violating labor laws].”88
As Keith Cunningham-Parmeter suggests, “Hoffman is less concerned
with how remedial limitations harm unauthorized immigrants than with the
damage done to the workplace protection at issue.”89 He concludes ex-
tending Hoffman’s bar on back pay for unauthorized workers would gut both
the anti-discrimination intent of Title VII and the wage protections of the
FLSA.90 Because the remedial scheme of Title VII is so important to effec-
tively deterring employers from discriminating against employees and a ban
on back pay would leave “unauthorized workers with no viable remedy in
most Title VII cases,” reading IRCA to prohibit back pay to unauthorized
workers asserting a Title VII claim would undermine Title VII’s enforcement
goal.91 Indeed, unauthorized workers may still assert claims under Title VII
84 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1375 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, GAO/GGD-90-62, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANC-
TIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 41–42 (1990)); see also Griffith, supra note 1,
at 418.
85 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1375.
86 Id. at 1376 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006)).
87 See id. at 1375–78.
88 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002).
89 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1386.
90 See id. at 1379–90, see also discussion infra Part II.B.
91 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1380–86. After Hoffman, the EEOC rescinded
prior guidance that had explicitly stated unauthorized workers were entitled to back pay under
Title VII. See EEOC, DIRECTIVE 915.002, RESCISSION OF ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REME-
DIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAWS (2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html [https://perma.cc/
9Q2S-773F]. The directive takes no position on whether such workers post-Hoffman may
claim back pay but states the EEOC’s commitment “vigorously to pursue charges filed by any
worker covered by the federal employment discrimination laws, including charges brought by
undocumented workers,” and to “seek appropriate relief consistent with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Hoffman. Enforcing the law to protect vulnerable workers, particularly low income
and immigrant workers, remains a priority for EEOC.” Id. The DOL has taken a similar posi-
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and most courts have determined they may seek the full range of Title VII’s
remedies.92
Likewise, IRCA does not mean that FLSA remedies are unavailable to
unauthorized workers. The FLSA, like Title VII, depends on its remedial
scheme to achieve its substantive purpose.93 As a result, denying workers
remedy under the statute would “undermine the statute’s ability to attain its
stated purpose.”94 Congressional intent to provide strong remedies to all
workers, even unauthorized workers, who are the victims of wage and hour
theft, is also demonstrated by the non-discretionary nature of back pay
awards under the FLSA, which unlike back pay in Title VII and the NLRA
are mandatory.95 Courts have found that unauthorized workers who bring
FLSA claims are entitled to the Act’s full range of remedies because to do
otherwise would reward the employer’s illegal conduct.96 In Lucas v. Jerusa-
lem Cafe´, LLC, a jury found in favor of a group of unauthorized workers,
affirming that the employer had violated the FLSA, and the district court
awarded the workers actual damages for unpaid wages, liquidated damages,
legal fees, and expenses.97 The Eighth Circuit, in upholding the damages
award, reasoned that despite the workers’ unauthorized status, the employers
still had to comply with federal employment law.98 The court also considered
the impact of Hoffman on the workers’ ability to recover damages and agreed
with the Eleventh Circuit that “IRCA does not express Congress’ clear and
manifest intent to exclude undocumented aliens from the protection of the
FLSA.”99 Instead, the court determined that taking the legislative intent of
IRCA and FLSA together means that employers must “provide fair working
conditions and wages” even to unauthorized workers.100
Of course, the strong protections provided by federal employment law
do not mean that employers must hire unauthorized workers in the first
tion post-Hoffman, stating, “The Department’s Wage and Hour Division will continue to en-
force the FLSA and MSPA without regard to whether an employee is documented or
undocumented. Enforcement of these laws is distinguishable from ordering back pay under the
NLRA. . . . The Department of Labor is still considering the effect of Hoffman Plastics on
other labor laws it enforces, including those laws prohibiting retaliation for engaging in pro-
tected conduct.” DOL, Fact Sheet #48: Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers:
Effect of Hoffman Plastics decision on laws enforced by the Wage and Hour Division (2008),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.htm [https://perma.cc/827H-6VJX].
92 Even post-Hoffman, unauthorized workers are still considered employees and so while
not able to gain reinstatement or back pay under the NLRA, the National Labor Relations
Board may still enjoin an employer’s unlawful activities under the NLRA. See, e.g., Agri
Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
93 See Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, supra note 52, at 810–13; Cunningham-
Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1389.
94 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 81, at 1389.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, 711 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 2013)
(finding that a worker’s unauthorized status does not bar recovery under the FLSA).
97 721 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2013).
98 See id. at 933.
99 Id. at 935 (quoting Lamonica, 711 F.3d at 1308).
100 Id. at 936–37.
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place. Indeed, to do so would violate IRCA’s provisions.101 Rather, once
someone who is unauthorized is already in the workplace, the principles un-
derlying these three statutory schemes mean that employers cannot subject
their unauthorized employees to an abusive work environment. Therefore,
when employers do violate federal workplace laws, Congress intended that
the employers be held accountable.
B. Congress Intended to Encourage Employees to Report Violations
of Federal Workplace Laws
Congress included several provisions in Title VII and the FLSA so that
workers will come forward to report employer violations of those laws. By
encouraging employees to come forward, the provisions also mean that em-
ployers who violate the laws are held accountable.102
Title VII103 and the FLSA104 encourage employees to report violations
of federal workplace law in three ways. First, the statutes include anti-
retaliation provisions105 that sweep more broadly in their protections and
remedies than the underlying substantive provisions. Second, courts grant
protective orders prohibiting employers from inquiring about employees’ im-
migration status to employees who report employer violations of Title VII
and the FLSA. Third, both statutory schemes also provide for recovery of
attorney’s fees.106 These provisions protect and offer incentives for employ-
ees who expose employer violations.
Title VII protects workers in the United States from some forms of
discrimination in employment.107 Section 703 of Title VII makes it illegal for
an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of the em-
ployee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.108 Unlawful discrimina-
tion encompasses a range of actions that an employer may undertake based
101 See INA § 274A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a); see also Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp., 186
F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that an employee who was not authorized for work in the
United States could not assert a failure to hire claim under Title VII and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act because the employee was not a “qualified employee”).
102 See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333
(2011) (noting that the anti-retaliation provisions help to ensure the enforcement of the FLSA);
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–74 (2011) (finding the same
for Title VII).
103 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e17 (2012).
104 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–262 (2012).
105 See Griffith, supra note 1, at 434–37.
106 Id. at 432–33.
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17.
108 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. . . .
Id.
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on an employee’s protected status, including failure to hire, termination of
employment, failure to promote, or altering an employee’s terms and condi-
tions of employment.109 Besides prohibiting discrimination on account of
race, religion, sex, national origin, Title VII contains provisions prohibiting
retaliation:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partic-
ipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing
under this title.110
Through its anti-retaliation provision, Title VII protects employees who
oppose unlawful discrimination and those who participate in an investigation
into employer conduct made illegal under the Act.111 In Crawford v. Metro-
politan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Supreme Court
found that Title VII’s opposition clause protected an employee who was fired
after she reported sexual harassment to her employer in response to the em-
ployer’s inquiry during an internal investigation.112 The Court reasoned that
to find otherwise would discourage most employees from reporting work-
place discrimination because they would fear retaliation without remedy.113
Similarly, the Court has found that unlike Title VII’s “substantive
prohibitions,” which only prohibit employer actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment, the anti-retaliation provisions prohibit any em-
ployer action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”114 In reaching its decision,
the Court highlighted the different purposes of the anti-discrimination provi-
sions and the prohibition on retaliation in Title VII to demonstrate congres-
sional intent.115 The Court noted that the anti-discrimination provisions
sought to ensure a workplace free from sex, race, color, national origin, and
religion-based discrimination.116 Because that part of Title VII seeks to pre-
vent injury to employees based on their protected status, the Court reasoned
that all that Congress needed to do was to prohibit such discrimination.117
On the other hand, Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation is designed to
ensure the elimination of discrimination by encouraging employees to report
violations of Title VII.118 To achieve that end, Congress could not just limit
109 Id. § 2000e-2(a).
110 Id. § 2000e-3(a).
111 See id.
112 555 U.S. 271, 279–80 (2009).
113 Id. at 279.
114 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
115 See id. at 62.
116 See id. at 63.
117 See id.
118 See id.; see also Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, supra note 52, at 783 (noting that
“between 1997 and 2011, the number of civil rights employment lawsuits filed by private
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\11-1\HLP102.txt unknown Seq: 19  2-FEB-17 13:48
2017] Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement 313
the retaliation prohibition to employer conduct that affects the employee’s
terms and conditions of employment, but had to include a broader range of
conduct because an employer could still “effectively retaliate against an em-
ployee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by caus-
ing him harm outside the workplace.”119 Therefore, to fully effect
congressional intent in eliminating unlawful employer practices, Title VII
prohibits all employer conduct that could discourage employees from report-
ing violations.120 In other words, Congress intended the retaliation provisions
to reach more broadly than the discrimination provisions and protect work-
ers not just from unlawful discrimination but from any action that would
dissuade them from reporting.
Likewise, in Thompson v. North American Steel Co., the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII prohibits a
broader range of employer conduct than the anti-discrimination provisions
because congressional intent was to encourage employees to report.121 North
American Steel Company argued that its termination of the fiance´ of a fe-
male employee who had complained about sex discrimination did not violate
the retaliatory provisions of Title VII because it did not take action against
the complaining party but rather a third party.122 The Court rejected the argu-
ment because “a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in
protected activity if she knew that her fiance´ would be fired.”123 Accord-
ingly, the Court has clearly stated that the anti-retaliation provisions of Title
VII are broad and Congress intended them to encourage employees to report
their employers’ violations of Title VII.
The FLSA likewise has broad anti-retaliation provisions in addition to
its minimum wage standards, overtime requirements, and equal pay provi-
sions.124 Section 215 of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer:
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any em-
ployee because such employee has filed any complaint or insti-
tuted any proceeding under or related to [the FLSA], or has
testified or is about to testify in such proceeding, or has served or
is about to serve on an industry committee.125
The FLSA’s retaliation provision, like Title VII’s, was specifically designed
to encourage employees to report their employers’ violations of the Act. The
Supreme Court has noted that the FLSA prohibits “labor conditions detri-
mental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
plaintiffs was more than fifty-one times the number filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission”).
119 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63.
120 Id.
121 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
122 See id. at 174.
123 Id.
124 See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207 (West 2016).
125 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).
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health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”126 It affirmatively
sets “forth substantive wage, hour, and overtime standards.”127 And, like
Title VII, the FLSA counts on workers reporting violations to ensure the
effective enforcement of its provisions.128
The Court has confirmed that Congress intended that the FLSA en-
courage employees to come forward. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perform-
ance Plastics Corp., the Court rejected an employer’s argument that it did
not retaliate against an employee because the employee only complained
orally and not in writing, in part, because Congress intended the anti-retalia-
tion provision to prevent workers from being afraid to come forward and
“quietly to accept substandard conditions.”129 Further underscoring that
Congress intended that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision encourage
workers to come forward is that it provides for broader relief than the sub-
stantive provisions. Pursuant to section 216(b), employees may seek equita-
ble remedies in addition to legal remedies when they experience
retaliation.130 In an FLSA suit requesting a preliminary injunction restraining
further retaliation from an employer, the Eleventh Circuit noted that includ-
ing equitable remedies served the provision’s purpose of inducing employees
to report violations of the Act.131
Congressional intent that workers report workplace abuses without fear
of retaliation has also formed the basis for courts to regularly grant protec-
tive orders prohibiting discovery into workers’ immigration status. For exam-
ple, in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized that allowing
employers to request information related to workers’ immigration status in
discovery would chill millions of unauthorized workers from reporting their
employers’ violation of Title VII and other workplace laws.132 Moreover, the
court noted that it could have a similar impact on workers with immigration
status and even citizens might balk at having their own immigration status
examined in a public setting.133 Accordingly, the attendant “chilling effect
such discovery [into immigration status] could have on the bringing of civil
rights actions unacceptably burdens the public interest.”134
126 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)).
127 Id.
128 Id.; see also Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, supra note 52, at 782–83
(“[B]etween 2000 and 2011, private plaintiffs filed thirty-seven times the number of Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) lawsuits than did the U.S. Department of Labor.”).
129 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288, 292 (1960)).
130 The FLSA provides that “[a]ny employer who violates the [retaliation provisions of
the FLSA] shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of [the retaliation provisions of the FLSA], including without limitation employ-
ment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
131 See Bailey v. Gulf Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002).
132 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2004).
133 Id. at 1065.
134 Id.; see also Reyes v. Snowcap Creamery, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (D. Colo.
2012) (finding the prejudice to the plaintiff in an FLSA suit and the chilling effect of disclo-
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Title VII and the FLSA also encourage employees to come forward by
allowing for the recovery of attorney’s fees.135 Title VII allows the court to
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.136 One of the reasons that Title
VII provides for attorney’s fees is to encourage employees to report viola-
tions and enforce their rights. For example, in the section-by-section analysis
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress specifically noted that Title VII
included recovery of interest on attorney’s fees as part of the remedies be-
cause failure to do so would have “a chilling effect on the ‘private attorneys
general’ policy of federal civil rights laws.”137
The attorney’s fee provision in the FLSA is even stronger than that in
Title VII, as it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing
plaintiff.138 The legislative history for this provision also demonstrates that
Congress intended that it encourage employees to come forward:
[Employees] themselves . . . [can] maintain an action in any
court to recover the wages due them and in such a case the court
. . . shall also allow a reasonable attorney’s fees and assess the
court costs against the violator of the law so that employees will
not suffer the burden of an expensive lawsuit.139
Therefore, to secure full enforcement of Title VII and the FLSA, Congress
needed workers to come forward to report employer violations. To effect this
intent, Congress included anti-retaliation provisions in each statute to allay
employee fears of further harm and provided for the recovery of attorney’s
fees to induce workers to come forward.
sure outweighed any probative value in disclosure of immigration file); David v. Signal Int’l,
LLC, 257 F.R.D. 114, 125–26 (E.D. La. 2009) (prohibiting discovery into immigration status
in an FLSA suit due to the chilling and in terrorem effect); EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 F.
Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss Title VII lawsuit
based on employee’s unauthorized status because “Civil Rights actions are necessary to for-
ward the policies of Title VII, and a ruling that undocumented workers could not pursue civil
rights claims on their own behalf would likely chill these important actions.”). But see, e.g.,
Bermudez v. Karoline’s Int’l Rest. Bakery Corp., No. 12-6245, 2013 WL 6146083, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) (permitting discovery into FLSA plaintiff’s immigration status be-
cause although the chilling effect of discovery “is a legitimate, though not uncontroversial
concern” it did not outweigh the defendant’s need for the information).
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (2012) (recovery of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in
a Title VII action); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (recovery of attorney’s fees in an FLSA action);
P.L. 102-166, H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. II, at 34 (1991).
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (“In any action or proceeding under [Title VII] the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.”).
137 P.L. 102-166, H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. II, at 34 (1991).
138 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“[T]he court in [an FLSA] action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by
the defendant, and costs of the action.”).
139 Griffith, supra note 1, at 431 n.202 (quoting 83 CONG. REC. 9264 (1938) (statement of
Rep. Michael Feighan)).
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C. Congress Intended to Protect Workers Who Report Egregious
Workplace Abuses from Deportation
Congress also intended to protect unauthorized workers who report the
most severe forms of employer abuse by providing a means for those work-
ers to obtain authorized immigration status. Through the Victims of Traffick-
ing and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Congress created two new
nonimmigrant visas, one for victims of trafficking and other coercive em-
ployment practices, and one for victims of a broad range of criminal activ-
ity.140 The U visa is available to noncitizens who have been the victims of
certain crimes.141 The T visa is available to victims of a severe form of
human trafficking.142 Both visas provide a method for some unauthorized
workers who are subjected to workplace abuses to obtain status.
U visas are generally available to noncitizens who suffer workplace
abuses that rise to the level of criminal activity. A noncitizen may receive a
U nonimmigrant visa if she can demonstrate four things: (1) that she “has
suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a
victim of criminal activity”; (2) that she “possesses information concerning
criminal activity”; (3) that she “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is
likely to be helpful [to federal, state, or local law enforcement officials,
prosecutors or judges] . . . investigating or prosecuting criminal activity”;
and (4) that “the criminal activity . . . violated the laws of the United States
or occurred in the United States (including in Indian country and military
installations) or the territories and possessions of the United States.”143 A
number of crimes are defined as qualifying criminal activity under the stat-
ute, including crimes that can occur in the workplace.144
Through the creation of the U nonimmigrant visa, Congress expressly
intended to “strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect,
investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, [and]
trafficking of aliens, . . . while offering protection to victims of such offenses
in keeping with the humanitarian interests of the United States.”145  Another
purpose of the visa was to “facilitate the reporting of crimes to law enforce-
ment officials by trafficked, exploited, victimized, and abused aliens who are
not in lawful immigration status. It also gives law enforcement officials a
140 TVPA of 2000. The Act contains three subdivisions: Division A is the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, and section 107(e) created the T nonimmigrant visa; Division
B is the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, and Title V, section 1513 created the U nonim-
migrant visa; Division C contains miscellaneous provisions.
141 INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
142 INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T).
143 INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)–(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)–(IV).
144 INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (including “rape; torture; traf-
ficking; . . . sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; . . . being
held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful
criminal restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; . . . witness tampering; obstruction
of justice; perjury; fraud in foreign labor contracting. . . .”); see also Saucedo, Immigration
Enforcement Versus Employment Enforcement, supra note 9, at 311.
145 TVPA of 2000, id. at § 1513(a)(2)(A), 1533.
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means to regularize the status of cooperating individuals during investiga-
tions or prosecutions.”146
In keeping with the U visa’s intent to facilitate law enforcement’s inves-
tigations into underlying criminal activities, noncitizens applying for a U
nonimmigrant visa must provide USCIS with a certification from a law en-
forcement agency that states the noncitizen “‘has been helpful, is being
helpful, or is likely to be helpful’ in the investigation or prosecution of crimi-
nal activity.”147 A U nonimmigrant must also have not committed certain
acts that would make her inadmissible, such as criminal activity or drug
offenses, or fall within other grounds of inadmissibility, such as being likely
to become a public charge or having a communicable disease of public
health concern.148 However, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the dis-
cretion to waive any grounds of inadmissibility, with a very limited excep-
tion.149 In addition to more traditional law enforcement agencies like the
DOJ, DHS, or local police agencies, among the law enforcement agencies
that can sign the law enforcement certificate are the EEOC and the DOL.150
Noncitizens who have been a victim of a severe form of human traf-
ficking may apply for a T nonimmigrant visa.151 A “severe form[ ] of traf-
ficking in persons” is defined not only as sex trafficking, but also as “the
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for
labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose
of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.”152
A T visa applicant must show that she is present in the United States on
account of the trafficking,153 and that she “has complied with any reasonable
request for assistance in the Federal, State, or local investigation or prosecu-
tion of acts of trafficking or the investigation of crime where acts of traffick-
ing are at least one central reason for the commission of that crime.”154
Unlike a U visa applicant, a T visa applicant is not required to submit a law
enforcement certificate. However, “statements from . . . law enforcement
officials that the alien has complied with any reasonable request for assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of crimes such as kidnapping, rape,
slavery, or other forced labor offenses . . . shall be considered.”155
Noncitizens who receive a U or T visa are also eligible for work author-
ization.156 Both U and T nonimmigrant status lasts for a period of four
146 Id. at § 1513(a)(2)(B), 1534.
147 INA § 214(p)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (2006).
148 INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).
149 USCIS may not waive the inadmissibility ground for noncitizens who participated in
“Nazi persecution, genocide, or the commission of any act of torture or extrajudicial killing.”
INA § 212(a)(3)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E).
150 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2016).
151 INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012).
152 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2012).
153 INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(II).
154 INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(aa), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(aa).
155 INA § 214(o)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(6) (2006).
156 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(16), (19) (2016).
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years.157 Importantly, both U and T nonimmigrants can permanently regular-
ize their status by applying for adjustment of status, i.e., to become a legal
permanent resident, after three years,158 or in the case of T nonimmigrants
once the law enforcement agency certifies that the underlying trafficking
case is closed.159
Congress’s creation of two categories of visas to regularize the status of
otherwise unauthorized workers who have suffered workplace abuses dem-
onstrates its intent to protect, not prosecute, vulnerable workers. First, in
passing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
Congress found that “[t]rafficking in persons . . . includes forced labor and
involves significant violations of labor, public health, and human rights stan-
dards worldwide.”160 This shows that Congress viewed violations of work-
place laws as significant enough to include them among the list of activities
the Act condemns.
In passing the Act, Congress also indicated that it was concerned with
treating victims of labor exploitation as criminals based only on crimes re-
lated to the exploitation.161 Specifically, it found that victims of severe forms
of trafficking should not be “inappropriately incarcerated, fined or otherwise
penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being traf-
ficked, such as using false documents, entering the country without docu-
mentation, or working without documentation.”162
Second, in passing the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, which
created the U nonimmigrant visa, Congress expressed similar concerns and
made similar findings. It emphasized the protective and humanitarian role
the U visa should serve for unauthorized immigrants: “[t]he purpose . . . is
to create a new nonimmigrant visa . . . that will strengthen the ability of law
enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute [crimes against
noncitizens] . . . while offering protection to victims of such offenses in
keeping with the humanitarian interests of the United States.”163 Congress
also found that regularizing the status of unauthorized victims of workplace
exploitation would encourage victims to come forward:
Creating a new nonimmigrant visa classification will facilitate the
reporting of crimes to law enforcement officials by trafficked, ex-
ploited, victimized, and abused aliens who are not in lawful immi-
gration status. It also gives law enforcement officials a means to
157 INA § 214(p)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2006); INA § 214(o)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1184(o)(7)(A) (2006).
158 INA § 245(m), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m) (2012); INA § 245(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l) (2012).
159 INA § 245(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l).
160 TVPA of 2000, at § 102(b)(3), 1466.
161 Id. at § 102(b)(19), 1468.
162 Id.
163 See Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. B, tit. V
§ 1513(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note.
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regularize the status of cooperating individuals during investiga-
tions or prosecutions.164
That Congress also allowed the DHS Secretary to waive almost all grounds
of admissibility for U visa applicants165 shows Congress wanted to remove
any barriers to regularizing such workers’ status. This further supports that
Congress wanted to encourage workers who have suffered the most egre-
gious abuses to come forward.
Finally, Congress also expressed its intent to protect vulnerable workers
through the criminal provisions it enacted as part of the Victims of Traffick-
ing and Violence Act of 2000. It included within the definition of “coer-
cion”: “the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.”166 In 2008, it
amended the definition of “the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal pro-
cess” in the criminal statute to define it as “the use or threatened use of a
law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any man-
ner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert
pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or re-
frain from taking some action.”167 Congress also defined the range of harm
to include “nonphysical harms that are legally sufficient to establish forced
labor includ[ing] ‘psychological, financial, or reputational harm.’” 168 Con-
gress similarly included within the definition of legal coercion “compelling
labor through threats of any legal proceeding, whether ‘administrative, civil,
or criminal’, [t]hus, threats of deportation . . . also qualify as a prohibited
means of legal coercion.”169 The language of the TVPA, its amendments, and
the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 show that Congress was aware
that unauthorized workers were in the workplace, were vulnerable to ex-
ploitation, and thus deserved protection.170
164 Id. at § 1513(a)(2)(C).
165 INA § 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14) (2012).
166 TVPA of 2000, at § 103(2)(C), 22 U.S.C. § 7102(2) (2012).
167 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1) (2012).
168 Kim, supra note 10, at 451 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2)).
169 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (c)(1)).
170 The way in which the TVPA of 2000 defines victims worthy of protection is not with-
out its problems. As Kim has noted, the key to claiming protection under the TVPA of 2000 is
the “dyadic relationship of perpetrator to victim.” Id. at 470. While the INA itself can be seen
as creating structural coercion by forcing unauthorized workers into accepting substandard
working conditions out of fear that reporting workplace violations will lead to their removal
due to their unlawful status, unauthorized immigrants may not claim protection based on coer-
cion or abuse of the legal process as defined in the TVPA based on an abusive workplace and
their unauthorized status alone. Id. at 470–71.
Instead, the TVPA “requires that the employer intentionally take advantage of a worker’s
vulnerabilities to exploit.” Id. at 470–71 (emphasis added). In such circumstances, the worker’s
only recourse may be the U visa. But as Saucedo has noted, that too has its limits. See
Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement, supra note 9, at
312. Unlike the T visa, the U visa does not specifically provide for immunity from prosecution
for fraudulent identity documents, its annual quota of only ten thousand per fiscal year means
that most applicant must wait years before receiving the visa, and the definition of crime,
while inclusive of many types of workplace crimes, could be expanded to include wage and
hour violations, discrimination, and collective bargaining violations. Id. at 312, 319.
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D. Prosecuting Workers Contradicts Congressional Intent
When DOJ criminally prosecutes workers or DHS seeks the deportation
of workers who have come forward to report workplace abuses, it contra-
dicts congressional intent. Such prosecutions discourage employees from
coming forward, incentivize employers to use DOJ or DHS to escape liabil-
ity and to further exploit marginalized workers, and put a barrier in the path
to status regularization that Congress intended to create through the U and T
nonimmigrant visas.
Prosecutions of workers have chilled their reporting of employer viola-
tions of workplace laws. Workers have become increasingly afraid to report
their employers because of government prosecutors’ “added leverage to seek
convictions” against the unauthorized workers when they report.171 For ex-
ample, ICE raided Houston-area employment agencies that, according to a
DHS official, “delivered illegal workers to greedy restaurant owners around
the country.”172 The workers were forced “to put in 12-hour days, labored
six days a week and were not paid overtime or allowed to keep tips or gratui-
ties.”173 While ICE arrested the owners of the employment agency and
twenty-one owners and managers of restaurants who employed the workers,
ICE also arrested at least eleven workers, too.174
In addition to criminal prosecutions, employers can threaten unautho-
rized workers with deportation. Courts have acknowledged this dynamic in
immigrant workplaces.175 In Rivera, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, “Granting
employers the right to inquire into workers’ immigration status in [federal
employment discrimination suits] would allow them to raise implicitly the
threat of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, docu-
mented or undocumented, reports illegal practices.”176 Various news reports
over the past decade have reported on workers in several industries who
were threatened with deportation by their employers and therefore hesitated
171 Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement, supra note
9, at 308.
172 James Pinkerton, Chinatown Raid Targets Exploitation of Illegal Workers, HOUS.
CHRON. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Chinatown
-raid-targets-exploitation-of-illegal-5188938.php [https://perma.cc/4KLS-RY8G] (quoting
Brian Moskowitz, Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Houston).
173 Id.
174 Id.; see also Jonathan Dienst & Greg Cergol, Feds Raid Nearly a Dozen Long Island 7-
Elevens in Illegal Immigration Probe: Officials, NBC N.Y. (June 17, 2013), http://www
.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Human-Smuggling-Investigation-7-Eleven-Long-Island-Federal-
Agents-Police-211793521.html [https://perma.cc/59SQ-HP9S] (describing ICE workplace
raid in which ICE arrested not only the owners and managers but also some of the workers
whom the owners and managers exploited).
175 See Bailey v. Gulf Transp., 280 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases).
176 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004); cf. Cordova v. R & A
Oysters, Inc., No. 14-0462-WS-M, 2016 WL 951570 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2016) (recognizing
that allowing employers to revoke employees’ temporary work visas in response to worker
retaliation complaints would “condone prior violations of [the Fair Labor Standards Act] and
encourage future violations.”) (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S.
137, 151 (2002)).
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to report workplace violations.177 These fears have, in fact, led to underre-
porting, thereby undermining Congress’s intent to encourage workers to re-
port workplace abuses.178
Employee fears have also allowed employers to cultivate exploitable
workforces. Leticia Saucedo has ably explored employers’ creation of a sub-
servient, “brown-collar” workplace and potential theories of liability for
employment discrimination for creating such workplaces.179 She argues that
employers prefer an exploitable, subservient workforce and as a result create
jobs that United States citizens will not take as a means to hire only vulnera-
ble workers.180 Employers do this through network hiring, paying low wages,
creating undesirable working conditions for the targeted jobs, “de-skilling”
jobs, and avoiding hiring United States born workers for the jobs.181
DHS’s and DOJ’s increased enforcement has further “facilitate[d]
[workers’] exploitation rather than prevent[ed] it”182 and allowed employers
to evade accountability for workplace abuses. Lee has described how em-
ployers have capitalized on the perception of unauthorized workers as
“criminal aliens” in their use of local law enforcement to crack down on
unauthorized workers seeking to vindicate their workplace rights.183 Some
employers have also been able to escape liability under employment laws
due to their employee’s violation of immigration laws. Those employers
have convinced judges that the employee is unworthy of protection because
she engaged in criminal acts such as presenting false documents or entering
177 See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Carwash Workers and Capitol Hill: Immigration in Limbo, IN
THESE TIMES (Sep. 11, 2013), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/15563/carwashes_and_
capitol_hill_immigration_in_limbo [https://perma.cc/8GEC-M45H] (describing carwash
workers afraid to report safety and wage violations for fear of deportation); 41 Action News
Staff, KCK Roofing Company Owners Indicted in Undocumented Workers Kickback Threat,
KSHB KAN. CITY (June 14, 2016), http://www.kshb.com/news/region-kansas/kck/kck-roofing-
company-owners-indicted-in-undocumented-workers-kickback-threat [https://perma.cc/
NG5Z-47UT] (describing construction workers who were afraid to report employer exploita-
tion because employers had threatened them with deportation); Sasha Khokha, Silenced By
Status, Farm Workers Face Rape, Sexual Abuse, NPR (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.npr.org/
2013/11/05/243219199/silenced-by-status-farm-workers-face-rape-sexual-abuse [https://per
ma.cc/2KUL-P3EX] (attributing failure of female farmworkers initially to report their em-
ployer’s sexual assaults to the farmworkers’ fear of deportation).
178 Griffith, supra note 1, at 437–38 (describing the evidence that workers have resisted
reporting violations out of fear of deportation); see also Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation,
supra note 52, at 780–81.
179 See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the
Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006); Leticia M. Saucedo,
Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345
(2009).
180 See Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of
the Brown Collar Workplace, supra note 179, at 973.
181 Id. at 976–80; see also Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, supra note 52, at 810–13
(discussing the susceptibility of brown collar workers to employer threats and the impact on
the workers’ ability to assert their legal rights).
182 Kim, supra note 10, at 415.
183 Stephen Lee, Workplace Enforcement Workarounds, 21 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J.  549,
564–67 (2012).
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without inspection.184 Kathleen Kim has argued that despite workplace pro-
tections, “[U]ndocumented workers remain severely constrained in the ex-
ercise of their free labor rights” due to threats of criminal prosecution and
deportation.185
Moreover, workers who have been deported, are in detention, or are in
prison for a criminal conviction will find it difficult if not impossible to
assert their rights as private attorneys generals through a Title VII or FLSA
suit.186 A criminal conviction for document fraud will also make it difficult
for an unauthorized worker to obtain a U or T nonimmigrant visa as docu-
ment fraud is a ground of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act.187 Furthermore, if the unauthorized noncitizen is unable to obtain a
U visa before her immigration proceedings finalize,188 she will have a diffi-
cult time completing the process from outside the country. The prosecution
of unauthorized workers who report violations of workplace laws, then, con-
tradicts congressional intent as expressed through Title VII, the FLSA,
IRCA, and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.
III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO PROTECT EXPLOITED WORKERS
SUPPORTS THE USE OF EQUITABLE PROSECUTION
AND EXECUTIVE ESTOPPEL
Because Congress intended to protect, not prosecute, workers, the agen-
cies charged with enforcing the statutory schemes should protect exploited
workers. This part will explain what the current barriers are to workers re-
ceiving that protection and propose two solutions—equitable prosecution
and executive estoppel—to overcome those barriers.
Despite clear congressional intent that unauthorized workers be pro-
tected, not prosecuted, when they suffer workplace abuses, not all workers
have a firm footing under current law to prevent their prosecutions. Some
individual workers may qualify for U or T visas if they are the victims of
other crimes in the workplace like a severe form of human trafficking, rape,
184 Cimini, supra note 81, at 411–14 (describing cases in which courts denied workers’
FLSA claims, tort-based lost wages claims, or workplace injury claims due to the workers’
presenting false employment documents (IRCA-fraud) or unlawful presence).
185 Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1569 (2015).
186 See discussion supra Part II.B.
187 See INA § 212(a)(2)(A) (2012), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (encompassing crimes in-
volving moral turpitude). But see supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (stating the At-
torney General may waive grounds of inadmissibility); INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv) (allowing the Attorney General to waive most grounds of inadmissibility
for a U nonimmigrant applicant if it is in the public interest); TVPA of 2000, at § 107(e)(3)
(containing specific provisions that prevent the criminal prosecution of individuals that were
directly related to the trafficking).
188 This is a real possibility given the ten thousand limit per year on U nonimmigrant visas
and that USCIS ran out of visas for FY 2016 less than three months after the first day of the
fiscal year. See USCIS Approves 10,000 U Visas for 7th Straight Fiscal Year, USCIS (Dec. 29,
2015), https://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-approves-10000-u-visas-7th-straight-fiscal-year
[https://perma.cc/QSM6-EGPT].
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battery or assault, kidnapping, or abusive sexual contact. Ulu, the restaurant
worker, would fall into this category.
But workers like Gustavo, who suffer more run-of-the-mill workplace
violations such as unlawful discrimination in hiring, promotion, termination,
or wage violations, without more, will not qualify for immigration relief and
must remain in their unauthorized status and subject to deportation.189 This
can interfere with their ability to pursue their workplace rights and rewards
the employers who exploited them.
Two possible solutions drawing on equitable concepts in current law
exist to address these concerns. First, requesting the equitable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion could minimize the more severe harms that would
result from criminal prosecution or removal proceedings for any worker who
has come forward to report workplace abuses. Second, executive estoppel—
that is, estopping the actions of DHS or DOJ because another executive
agency like the EEOC or the DOL has certified the unauthorized worker as a
qualifying victim of crime or trafficking—would assist those workers who
have suffered the most egregious workplace abuses.
A. Prosecutors Should Exercise Equitable Enforcement Through
Prosecutorial Discretion
For a worker like Gustavo, who will be unable to qualify for the U or T
visa, requesting that a DOJ prosecutor or ICE attorney equitably exercise
prosecutorial discretion may be his only option. Prosecutors with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office should exercise their discretion to avoid or mitigate the
impact of prosecution on unauthorized workers at several stages: the charg-
ing decision, plea-bargaining, and sentencing. Prosecutors, immigration
judges, and officers with ICE can similarly exercise their discretion at differ-
ent stages in removal proceedings, including the decision to issue a Notice to
Appear in Removal Proceedings, the grant of deferred action, the termina-
tion of immigration proceedings, and the administrative closure of immigra-
tion cases.
A prosecutor’s equitable use of discretion is not just a matter of agency
grace. First, the structural limits of prosecutorial discretion demonstrate it is
bounded and guided by congressional intent. Second, both DHS and DOJ
have internal guidelines and have entered into memoranda of understanding
that should lead to prosecutors equitably exercising their discretion. Finally,
prosecutors’ ethical guidelines support the equitable exercise of discretion.
189 See discussion supra Part II.D. Currently, there are few empirical studies that consider
how widespread the problem is. See Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the
Borders of Immigration and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 611, 615–17
(2012). Further, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to enjoin the Obama
administration from exercising prosecutorial discretion on a class-wide basis for almost 4.4
million people in the country without authorization. United States v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2271
(2016), aff’g 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). As a result, those individuals will “remain highly
vulnerable to workplace exploitation.” Kim, supra note 185, at 1578.
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1. The Structural Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion Support Its
Equitable Exercise
Although a prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute is generally un-
reviewable, structural limits support the equitable exercise of that discretion.
Those limits are based on separation of powers principles, including the
prosecutor’s role as an executive actor, structural roles in criminal proceed-
ings, and the prosecutor’s delegated authority.
It is generally accepted that a federal prosecutor’s decision whether to
prosecute is unreviewable.190 Most courts base their deference to
prosecutorial charging decisions in the separation of powers doctrine.191 Be-
cause such decisions go to enforcement choices, they are viewed as firmly
within the realm of executive power.192 Courts anchor this view in the “Take
Care” clause of the United States Constitution.193
Nonetheless, because DOJ and DHS are federal executive agencies, the
Constitution places structural limits on what they can do. Because the basis
for deference relies on the agency as an executive actor,194 deference to
agency discretion should apply only when it is consistent with that role. Fur-
thermore, in the criminal context, separation of powers requires “a strict
division of authority among the three branches . . . that give[s] each branch
a strong check on the others in criminal proceedings. Indeed, convictions
require all three branches of government to agree, as well as the approval of
a jury.”195 In immigration proceedings, while enforcement and adjudication
authority rests with the executive agency, “‘the internal law of administra-
tion’—including structural separation and supervision within an agency—is
a critically important means of checking agencies and holding bureaucrats
accountable.”196 And, in both criminal and immigration prosecutions, the
agency’s authority is limited to that prescribed by Congress. Recently, in
Arlington v. FCC, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that federal agencies’ role
in administering congressional statutes is “prescribed by Congress, so that
when they act improperly, no less than when they act beyond their jurisdic-
tion, what they do is ultra vires.”197
190 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1044 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow II]; Barkow I, supra note 17, at 874–75; Eagly,
supra note 16, at 1320–21; Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal
Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3 (2009); Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
243, 286 (2010).
191 See Krauss, supra note 190, at 10 (citing cases demonstrating this deference).
192 See id.; see also Barkow I, supra note 17, at 876.
193 Krauss, supra note 190, at 10 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). The “Take Care” clause
provides the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3.
194 Barkow I, supra note 17, at 876.
195 Barkow II, supra note 190, at 994.
196 Barkow I, supra note 17, at 887.
197 Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013) (applying Chevron deference to
agency interpretation of jurisdiction to act because it was not contrary to clear congressional
intent).
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The structural limits placed on prosecutorial discretion, then, mean that
DOJ and DHS must exercise it in a manner consistent with congressional
intent. As discussed above,198 Congress intended to protect workers like Gus-
tavo from abusive employers and to hold employers accountable when they
violate workplace laws. When a prosecution conflicts with that intent and
impedes the effective enforcement of workplace laws, that prosecution is not
one in which all three branches of government agree because it is contrary to
congressional intent.
As a result, executive actors in both the criminal court system and im-
migration system are obligated to take account of that intent when exercising
their authority. First, a worker like Gustavo has a strong argument that crimi-
nal prosecutors should exercise their discretion and decline to bring charges
in the first instance. If the equities are such that a criminal prosecution is
necessary, the prosecutor should exercise her discretion in a manner that
mitigates the consequences of any criminal conviction through creative plea-
bargaining and sentencing agreements that would avoid a conviction result-
ing in automatic removal.
Second, in immigration proceedings, DHS attorneys and officers should
exercise their discretion and grant deferred action or decline to place the
worker in immigration proceedings in the first place. Immigration judges
who work for the DOJ should also exercise their authority in keeping with
congressional intent and consider administratively closing cases in which a
worker is in a situation like Gustavo’s. This recognizes the structural limits
placed on executive agencies and allows them to exercise their discretion in
a manner that is consistent with the separation of powers theory that forms
the basis of the agencies’ authority to act in the first place.
2. Internal Guidelines and MOUs Support the Equitable Exercise of
Discretion
Both DOJ and DHS have internal guidelines, and DHS has entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOL that governs how
the agencies exercise their discretion.199 As a whole, the guidelines support
prosecutors’ use of discretion in instances where enforcing the law conflicts
with congressional intent to protect the persons whom the enforcement
agency seeks to prosecute.
The Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance
recognizes that victims of trafficking may be both victims and have criminal
culpability and calls for prosecutors to take account of that duality.200 It
198 See discussion supra Part II.
199 See DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & DEP’T. OF LABOR, REVISED MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CON-
CERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (Dec. 7, 2011), https://www.dol.gov/asp/
media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/4925-RABZ] [hereinafter MOU].
200 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS
ASSISTANCE 12 (2011 ed.) (Rev. May 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/
docs/ag_guidelines2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8NJ-6RVL].
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advises that a victim should be treated as a victim “despite any legal culpa-
bility that the victims may have for ancillary offenses, such as immigration
or prostitution crimes.”201 Similarly, the Attorney General’s guidelines in-
form department personnel that “[i]f a victim or witness is pursuing legal
[immigration] status, Department personnel should provide when warranted
by the circumstances, the supporting documentation that must come from
law enforcement.”202 Both of these guidelines suggest that prosecutors
should also exercise their discretion equitably when considering whether and
how to charge a worker like Gustavo who is both a victim and a perpetrator.
DHS’s guidelines are much clearer. The most recent memorandum on
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion explicitly directs DHS personnel to
consider exercising prosecutorial discretion based on the noncitizen’s “status
as a victim, witness or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings.”203 It sets
out a description of the ways in which the agency may exercise its
discretion:
In the immigration context, prosecutorial discretion should apply
not only to the decision to issue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to
Appear, but also to a broad range of other discretionary enforce-
ment decisions, including deciding: whom to stop, question, and
arrest; whom to detain or release; whether to settle, dismiss, ap-
peal, or join in a motion on a case; and whether to grant deferred
action, parole, or a stay of removal instead of pursuing removal in
a case.204
Based on DHS’s guidelines, the Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view (the division within DOJ in which Immigration Judges are based) is-
sued guidelines for immigration judges regarding when they may exercise
their discretion to continue cases or administratively close a case.205 The
guidelines direct immigration judges to administratively close cases or ask
DHS attorneys whether they wish to dismiss a case due to DHS’s announced
enforcement priorities.206
Furthermore, the DOL and DHS MOU shows DHS’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion should serve to emphasize the agency’s role in pro-
tecting, not prosecuting, workers like Gustavo. It provides that when DOL
has an ongoing investigation at a worksite, ICE agrees to avoid worksite
enforcement activities.207 Likewise, ICE will allow DOL to interview any
201 Id.
202 Id. at 12–13.
203 DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, POLICIES FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION AND
REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 6 (Nov. 20, 2014), www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3M3-QJ
J9].
204 Id. at 2.
205 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OPERATIONS & PROCEDURES MEMORANDUM
15-01: HEARING PROCEDURES FOR CASES COVERED BY NEW DHS PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES
(Apr. 6, 2015).
206 Id.
207 See MOU, supra note 199.
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workers ICE detains because of worksite enforcement activities.208 Impor-
tantly, the MOU includes a provision that “ICE agrees to consider DOL
requests that ICE grant a temporary law enforcement parole or deferred ac-
tion to any witness needed for a DOL investigation of a labor dispute during
the pendency of the DOL investigation and any related proceeding where
such witness is in the country unlawfully.”209 Therefore, taken together, the
MOU and DHS and DOJ’s guidelines support the equitable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in cases where workers come forward to report
workplace abuses.210
3. Prosecutorial Ethics Support the Equitable Exercise of
Discretion
Finally, prosecutors have ethical obligations they must follow, both as
attorneys and, specifically, as government attorneys who serve the public
interest. Leslie Griffin has explored those constraints and what they mean
for prosecutorial discretion.211 She argues that the ethics governing
prosecutorial discretion require “public moral judgment, a judgment rooted
in prosecutorial practice and experience.”212 They require, in short, that pros-
ecutors pay attention to office policy and procedures and consult with or ask
for review of discretionary decisions to ensure they exercise public moral
judgment.213
This idea, based on a public prosecutor’s ethical obligations, also sup-
ports the exercise of equitable discretion in cases like Gustavo’s. DOJ and
DHS, as set forth above, have policies which encourage the use of
prosecutorial discretion when a worker has been the victim of a workplace
crime. This idea also suggests that a prosecutor who is aware that the worker
has reported workplace violations and is involved in litigation to enforce his
rights should consult with the other agencies involved, like the EEOC or
DOL, to ensure that his prosecution will not impede their activities. Thus,
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 The Due Process Clause may also require that the agencies—in particular, DHS—
follow their guidelines in exercising discretion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held that DHS abused its discretion when it did not follow its own regulations governing the
wholly discretionary decision of whether to reinstate removal against a noncitizen. See Villa-
Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 880–82 (9th Cir. 2013). As the Villa-Anguiano court noted,
“Due process, in turn, entitles an unlawfully present alien to consideration of issues relevant to
the exercise of an immigration officer’s discretion.” Id. at 881. Although the guidelines dis-
cussed here do not have the force of law that regulations do, they may provide the basis for a
limited argument rooted in due process. A minimum level of due process requires that agen-
cies at least consider all the factors they have deemed relevant through their own guidelines
when they choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion that results in an action by the agency.
Id. At least one of those relevant factors is whether the worker was the victim of an exploita-
tive workplace and came forward to report the abuses. Id.
211 See generally Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259
(2001).
212 Id. at 307.
213 See id.
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even though a worker like Gustavo may have no permanent immigration
remedy, he is not without recourse. The structural limits on prosecutorial
authority, internal guidelines and memoranda, and prosecutorial ethics all
weigh in favor of the exercise of equitable prosecution.
B. Courts Should Recognize Executive Estoppel
For a noncitizen who has a U visa law enforcement certificate from a
federal agency like the EEOC or the DOL, estoppel should provide a solu-
tion to stop both her criminal prosecution and her deportation. Because es-
toppel traditionally involves one party estopping another based on the
actions previously taken by that party, this section also traces why estoppel
is appropriate when one party is seeking to estop the action of one federal
agency based on a factual determination or action by another federal agency.
It bases the argument on both the principles underlying equitable estoppel
and regulatory estoppel.
Equitable estoppel is a judicially-developed doctrine that allows a court
to exercise its “equitable power to estop a party from raising a particular
claim or defense” and it “operates apart from any underlying statutory
scheme.”214 Courts may estop a party from asserting a claim or defense
when the party has made a misrepresentation of fact that the other party
reasonably relied on to its detriment.215 But, when the government is a party,
the individual seeking estoppel must demonstrate “affirmative
misconduct.”216
One way to demonstrate affirmative misconduct on the part of the gov-
ernment is to rely on an agency’s affirmative representation of the law or
fact-finding. This is based on a form of equitable estoppel that applies when
an agency has violated its own “law”—regulatory estoppel.217 Agency law
can encompass everything “from legislative regulations, interpretive rules,
forms and pamphlets directed to the public, internal ‘housekeeping’ rules and
operating manuals, and unwritten agency customs to oral representation by
lower-level . . . . staff.”218 Peter Raven-Hansen has concluded that regulatory
estoppel applies “if the private reliance interest in agency obedience to its
own law outweighs the public interest in those legislative policies that would
be affected by regulatory estoppel in a given case.”219 In other words, regula-
tory estoppel is primarily concerned with fairness to the individual being
harmed by the agency’s incorrect application of the law.
Executive estoppel where one executive agency has acted in contraven-
tion of another fits within the underlying purposes of both equitable and
214 Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 724 (2d Cir. 2001).
215 Id. at 725 (citing Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984)).
216 See, e.g., Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985).
217 Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own “Laws,”
64 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 4.
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regulatory estoppel: to enforce repose, to establish uniformity in the applica-
tion of laws, and to ensure fairness.220 The application of executive estoppel
also recognizes the role of agency expertise. Finally, it meets the require-
ments of affirmative misconduct and reliance because it promotes obedience
to the law and is in keeping with separation of power principles. Executive
estoppel should apply, then, under circumstances in which one agency has
made a finding or taken action consistent with congressional intent, the party
relied on the first agency’s finding, and a second agency takes action that
undermines the first agency’s finding or action.
1. Executive Estoppel Fits Within the Purposes of Traditional
Estoppel Doctrines
Estopping one agency of the executive branch, ICE or DOJ, from pros-
ecuting workers who come forward to report violations of workplace laws
and are certified as victims of a workplace crime by another federal agency
would serve the purposes of estoppel. Estoppel doctrines have developed to
serve three main purposes: to enforce repose, to establish uniformity in the
application of laws, and to ensure fairness. Courts favor enforcing repose in
the context of administrative fact-finding:
[G]iving preclusive effect to administrative fact-finding serves the
value underlying general principles of estoppel: enforcing repose.
This value, which encompasses both the parties’ interests in avoid-
ing the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and the public’s
interest in conserving judicial resources . . . is equally implicated
whether fact-finding is done by a federal or a state agency.221
Thus, when a federal agency makes a finding of fact, efficiency goals
and litigation costs weigh in favor of giving that finding final effect. Accord-
ingly, Justice Douglas, in his dissent from INS v. Hibi, argued that estoppel
should apply to administrative agencies when they engage in conduct that is
contrary to congressional intent and results in harm: “The Court’s opinion
ignores the deliberate—and successful—effort on the part of agents of the
Executive Branch to frustrate the congressional purpose and to deny sub-
stantive rights to Filipinos such as respondent by administrative fiat, indicat-
ing instead that there was no affirmative misconduct involved in this
case.”222
In a situation like Ulu’s, a federal agency within the same branch of
government has engaged in administrative fact finding to determine that Ulu
is a “qualifying victim of crime” and that she cooperated in the agency’s
investigation of the crime under the provisions of the Immigration and Na-
220 See discussion supra Part III.A.
221 University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986) (citation omitted).
222 INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 11 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tionality Act.223 The law enforcement certificate, then, shows that one federal
agency already made a factual determination that the employer exploited the
worker in ways that would fall within the definitions of labor exploitation or
coercion. Thus, the executive has already determined that the individual was
a victim of labor exploitation deserving of protection based on the same
operative facts.224 Traditional notions of estoppel support that the worker
should not have to re-litigate this in a criminal or immigration enforcement
proceeding. Nor does the executive prosecuting the worker on one hand
while certifying the worker as a victim on the other hand serve the efficiency
goals of repose. Instead, according the EEOC’s determination that Ulu is a
qualifying victim of crime final effect better serves the principle of repose.
At least one court has applied estoppel against the DHS in a similar
situation involving two parts of the administration—DOJ and DHS. In
Amrollah v. Napolitano,225 the Fifth Circuit applied collateral estoppel
against the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a
sub-agency of the DHS. In earlier proceedings with the DOJ, the noncitizen
had applied for asylum and admitted that he had supported the mujahedeen
movement.226 Even though this could have disqualified the noncitizen from
eligibility for asylum, the immigration judge granted his asylum application
and the government did not appeal.227 The USCIS later denied the nonci-
tizen’s application for permanent residence “based on the support he had
provided to the mujahedeen movement.”228 The Fifth Circuit decided the
agency was precluded from finding the noncitizen ineligible “because his
grant of asylum necessarily included a determination that he did not provide
material support to a terrorist organization or member of such an organiza-
tion,”229 and “the [immigration judge’s] ruling that [the noncitizen] [could
receive asylum relief] necessarily included, under the structure of the stat-
ute, a finding that [the noncitizen] did not provide support to an individual
or organization that engaged in terrorist activities.”230 Other instances of
courts estopping an agency based on its prior actions include cases where the
DHS unreasonably delayed making a decision on an application.231
223 INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012) (setting forth the requirement
that the certifying agency find that the noncitizen was a victim of qualifying criminal activity
and that she cooperated in the investigation or prosecution of the crime).
224 See discussion supra Part II.D.
225 Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2013).
226 Id. at 570.
227 Id. at 573.
228 Id. at 570.
229 Id. at 571.
230 Id. at 572–73.
231 See, e.g., Wang v. Chertoff, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1109–13 (D. Idaho 2009) (citing
Tang v. Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D. Mass. 2007)) (discussing several other cases in
which courts found DHS or legacy INS’s delay unreasonable under the APA); see also Silva v.
Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979); Amanjee v. Chertoff, No. S-08-0499-JAM, 2009 WL
3476666 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009); Alibeik v. Chertoff, No C-07-1938-EDL, 2007 WL
4105527 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007); Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1980);
Paunescu v. INS, 75 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Marcetic v. INS, No. 97-C-7018, 1998
WL 173129 (N. D. Ill. 1998).
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In several areas of federal jurisprudence, including estoppel, another
underlying principle is to ensure consistency in the interpretation and the
application of federal law.232 Although the Constitution does not explicitly
require uniformity in the interpretation of federal law,233 the uniform inter-
pretation of federal laws, at a minimum, is necessary to safeguard other con-
stitutional and statutory rights.234 As set forth above, congressional intent to
protect, not prosecute, workers like Ulu is clear.235 Uniform and consistent
interpretation and application of the four statutory schemes—Title VII,
FLSA, IRCA, and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act236—require that the immigration court or federal court estop attempts by
ICE or DOJ to prosecute workers for whom the EEOC or another federal
agency has signed a law enforcement certificate. Finally, as a doctrine, es-
toppel is “invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases.”237 The prosecution
of workers whose employers have turned them over to ICE or DOJ for pros-
ecution requires the invocation of estoppel because rather than punishing the
wrongdoer it allows the wrongdoer to escape liability.238
2. Executive Estoppel Recognizes Agency Expertise
In addition to the traditional theories of equitable estoppel supporting a
theory of executive estoppel when one agency acts in contravention of a
finding by another, agency expertise also weighs in favor of executive estop-
pel. The Supreme Court has noted that it is the delegation by Congress to the
agency for fact-finding based on the agency’s expertise that supports the fi-
nality of the agency’s fact-finding:
Congress intended the boards (and like administrative representa-
tives) to be the fact-finders within their area of competence, . . . .
In light of [prior case law’s] evaluation of the statutory policy, we
should not squint to give a crabbed reading to the [agency’s] au-
232 See, e.g., Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine,
56 LOY. L. REV. 535, 536 (2010) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 159 (1953)) (stating uniformity is a “necessary corol-
lary to supremacy”). In University of Tennessee v. Elliott, the Court noted:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is of course not binding on federal courts, but we
can certainly look to the policies underlying the Clause in fashioning federal com-
mon-law rules of preclusion. “Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is to act as a nationally unifying force,” and this purpose is served by giving
preclusive effect to state administrative fact-finding rather than leaving the courts of
a second forum, state or federal, free to reach conflicting results.
478 U.S. 788, 799 (1996) (quoting Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 289
(1980) (White, J., concurring in judgment)).
233 Dragich, supra note 232, at 540.
234 Id. at 541.
235 See discussion supra Part II.
236 See discussion supra Part II.D.
237 See Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984).
238 See supra Part II.D (employer incentives to evade workplace laws by reporting unau-
thorized workers when they complain).
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thority where it has stayed within its sphere, but should accept it as
the primary fact-finding tribunal whose factual determinations . . .
must be received, if valid, in the same way as those of other courts
or of the independent administrative agencies. Under the more
modern view, the findings of the latter, at least when acting in an
adjudicatory capacity, are considered final, even in a suit not di-
rectly related to the administrative proceeding, unless there is
some good reason for a new judicial inquiry into the same facts.239
This principle applies to the factual findings made by the agency, even if the
agency had no authority to decide the legal issue.240 So long as the agency is
acting within its sphere of expertise, the courts and, at a minimum, other
agencies should defer to the findings of fact made by that agency.241 Requir-
ing that law enforcement agencies like DOJ or ICE defer to the factual find-
ings of labor enforcement agencies when the decisions involve a
determination of who is the victim of a workplace crime and who is the
perpetrator recognizes each agency’s expertise.242
3. Executive Affirmative Misconduct and Exploited Workers’
Reliance on Executive Actions Require Executive Estoppel
as a Remedy
When an agency takes action that directly conflicts with another
agency’s determination that a worker ought to be protected, the worker
should be able to show affirmative misconduct and reliance. The require-
ment that a litigant seeking estoppel against the government show affirma-
tive misconduct and reliance serves two main purposes—it promotes
obedience to the law and respects separation of powers. In cases where a
litigant seeks estoppel against a private party, courts have found that the
party to be estopped has engaged in misrepresentation if the misrepresenta-
tion is definite or “a misrepresentation by silence,” even in the absence of
the intent to deceive.243 However, the “[g]overnment may not be estopped
on the same terms as any other litigant.”244 Estoppel against the government
requires “affirmative misconduct” on the part of the government and a
239 United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421 (1966) (quoting United
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 339 F.2d 606, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (Davis, J., dissenting)).
240 Id. at 419.
241 Cf. Dragich, supra note 232, at 555 (“The enactment of federal statutes governing an
increasing array of issues—pursuant to Congress’s expansive power under the Commerce
Clause—itself indicates a desire for uniformity of federal laws across the country.”).
242 Cf. Lee, supra note 7, at 1092 (contrasting DOL’s role as the “nation’s top labor en-
forcement agency” with ICE’s “primary mission” of “target[ing] noncitizens for detention
and deportation”).
243 See Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 726 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 894(1), cmt. b).
244 See Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
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showing that the “wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and the pub-
lic’s interest will not suffer undue damage by imposition of liability.”245
The Supreme Court has stated that the reason for more narrow applica-
tion of equitable estoppel against the government is that “[w]hen the
[g]overnment is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents
has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedi-
ence to the rule of law is undermined.”246 Thus, in INS v. Hibi, the Court did
not apply estoppel against the government for its failure to publicize that
Filipino nationals who served in the U.S. armed forces during World War II
were eligible for naturalization in the United States and its failure to provide
consular officials in the Philippines to adjudicate the naturalization applica-
tions.247 Similarly, in Heckler v. Community Health Services, the Court held
that although a medical provider had relied on the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare’s intermediary’s advice, the Secretary’s subsequent, con-
trary finding was not subject to equitable estoppel.248 The Court determined
that the provider had an affirmative duty to educate itself through the rele-
vant statutes and regulations.249 Therefore, both Hibi and Heckler demon-
strate that promoting obedience to the law is a primary motivation for
requiring a litigant to demonstrate affirmative misconduct when she seeks to
estop the government.
Another objection to applying equitable estoppel against the govern-
ment is based “on the concern that courts would violate the separation of
powers if they were to estop an agency from enforcing legislative policies
just because the agency had violated its own rules.”250 But such concerns are
“neutralized” if the agency’s action violates a regulation or rule with the
force and effect of federal legislation because “the court faces competing
legislative claims and must of necessity choose between them.”251 Although
applying estoppel may result in blocking the legislative policy underlying
the agency’s action, not estopping the agency’s action also may result in vio-
lating a legislative “policy of equal dignity.”252
For example, in the immigration context, courts have estopped legacy
INS from denying benefits to applicants based on the agency’s failure to
follow its own guidelines in processing citizenship applications where those
guidelines conformed to congressional policy.253 In Harriott v. Ashcroft, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania estopped legacy INS from denying an ap-
plicant’s derivative citizenship application on the basis that the applicant had
245 See Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985).
246 Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60.
247 414 U.S. 5, 8–9 (1973).
248 See Heckler, 467 U.S. at 65–66.
249 Id.
250 Raven-Hansen, supra note 217, at 14.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See, e.g., Harriott v. Ashcroft, 277 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543–45 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing In
re Petition of Tubig, 559 F. Supp. 2d 2, 3–4 (N.D. Cal. 1981)).
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aged out—i.e., turned eighteen.254 The applicant had filed his application
around one year prior to turning eighteen but instead of acting on the appli-
cation within sixty days, as required by legacy INS’s internal guidelines, INS
delayed processing the application until after the applicant turned eigh-
teen.255 The court estopped the INS because it inexplicably deviated from its
internal guidelines and, but for the deviation, the applicant would have been
statutorily eligible for citizenship since he was under eighteen.256 Because
the guidelines served a congressional policy of ensuring children did not age
out before their application was processed, legacy INS’s actions conflicted
with congressional policy. Thus, legacy INS’s violation of the guidelines
demonstrated affirmative misconduct.
Therefore, courts have asserted two reasons to support that the concept
a litigant must demonstrate affirmative misconduct to estop the govern-
ment—to promote obedience to the law and separation of powers concerns.
Estopping the prosecution of workers who have cooperated in the investiga-
tion of workplace abuses promotes obedience to the law and recognizes the
separation of powers concerns. On the other hand, prosecuting workers
whose employers have turned them over for prosecution incentivizes the em-
ployers to flout workplace laws.257 Moreover, prosecuting workers who have
suffered workplace abuses and received a certification from another federal
agency that they deserve protection undermines congressional intent to pro-
tect those workers.258
These two points also may demonstrate “affirmative misconduct” on
the part of agency attorneys who prosecute workers like Ulu despite another
federal agency having determined the worker is deserving of protection. That
another federal agency signed a law enforcement certificate or granted a
nonimmigrant visa because the worker was deserving of protection, seems to
be the type of reliance that would deprive the worker of fair warning about
whether her conduct was criminal or deportable. Instead of providing a
warning to the worker about the potential consequences of coming forward,
federal agencies have encouraged workers to report their employers for vio-
lating federal workplace laws. To then turn around and prosecute the worker
after she comes forward is inconsistent with the executive’s prior assurances
that she can safely come forward to report.259
Finally, despite the more stringent requirements that a party must meet
to raise an estoppel defense against the government, courts have estopped
254 Id. at 544–45.
255 Id. at 543.
256 Id. at 544.
257 See discussion supra Part II.D.
258 See discussion supra Part II.D.
259 For example, an EEOC pamphlet informs noncitizen workers that the “EEOC is a
‘Certifying Agency’ for U Visas.” EEOC, EEOC Opens ‘New Frontier’ In War Against Human
Labor Trafficking (Aug. 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/upload/brochure-hu
man_trafficking.pdf  [https://perma.cc/KU2J-ALFA]. “This means that EEOC can help work-
ers who are victims of certain crimes apply to remain in the U.S. and continue to work, as long
as, they cooperate with law enforcement authorities.” Id.
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the government from criminally charging parties because a party relied on
the government’s prior interpretations of the law. In United States v. Penn-
sylvania Industrial Chemical Corporation, the Supreme Court found that a
criminal defendant could raise equitable estoppel as a defense in a criminal
proceeding. The government had alleged, in part, that the company’s failure
to obtain a permit to discharge waste violated the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899.260 One of the arguments that the company raised was that the Army
Corps of Engineers had “consistently construed” the River and Harbors Act
in a way that prohibited the discharge of only “those deposits that would
impede or obstruct navigation, thereby affirmatively misleading [the com-
pany] into believing that a . . . permit was not required as a condition to
discharges of matter involved in this case.”261 The Court agreed that the
company should be able to present evidence of its reliance on the Corps’
guidance in support of its defense to the charge:
Thus, to the extent that the regulations deprived [the Company] of
fair warning as to what conduct the Government intended to make
criminal, we think there can be no doubt that traditional notions of
fairness inherent in our system of criminal justice prevent the Gov-
ernment from proceeding with the prosecution.262
As the Court’s decision shows, a criminal defendant’s ability to demonstrate
reliance on the government’s consistent interpretation of a statute can sup-
port estoppel against the government.263
Workers who come forward and report violations of workplace laws to
one federal agency also can demonstrate reliance on the government’s con-
sistent interpretation of the U visa statutes in particular. Besides the EEOC’s
and DOL’s encouragement of workers to come forward to report abuses,264
DHS has also provided publically available guidelines that encourage work-
ers to come forward and report crime.265 Furthermore, other law enforcement
agencies, including DOJ, heavily lobbied for the creation of the U visa to
encourage victims to come forward to report violations of the law.266
Thus, under the theory of executive estoppel, the individual seeking
estoppel demonstrates affirmative misconduct and reliance when she shows
260 411 U.S. 655, 656–58 (1973).
261 Id. at 659–60.
262 Id. at 674 (citing Frank C. Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?—Proposals
as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953);
Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969)).
263 Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 674.
264 See discussion regarding retaliation supra Part II.B. See also discussion supra note
259.
265 See, e.g., Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (July 28, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-
trafficking-other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-ac
tivity-u-nonimmigrant-status [https://perma.cc/44HH-VCGF] (“Don’t be afraid to ask for
help: Immigration relief is available for victims of trafficking, domestic violence, and other
crimes.”).
266 See Saucedo, A New “U,” supra note 1, at 908.
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one executive agency has made a decision that contradicts another agency’s
prior action or fact determination, the decision is contrary to a congressional
policy, and the executive has consistently interpreted the statute in a manner
consistent with the prior agency’s action or fact determination. As discussed
above, this is consistent with the underlying reasons for the affirmative mis-
conduct requirement—it promotes obedience to the law and is in keeping
with separation of powers concerns. Accordingly, in situations like Ulu’s
where the worker has received a law enforcement certificate from a federal
agency, the worker will be able to demonstrate affirmative misconduct and
reliance.
CONCLUSION
When federal agencies choose to criminally prosecute or seek the re-
moval of unauthorized workers who have experienced workplace abuses, the
agencies contravene congressional intent. The criminal and immigration
prosecution of such workers discourages employees from reporting viola-
tions of workplace law, lets employers evade accountability for their illegal
conduct, and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for workers who would
otherwise qualify for immigration relief to obtain it. Instead of protecting the
workers as Congress intended, the agencies are playing into the hands of
employers who seek to capitalize on the workers’ vulnerable status.
This article has proposed two solutions for unauthorized workers who
find themselves being prosecuted or in removal proceedings after reporting
workplace abuses. First, unauthorized workers who have come forward to
report employer violations of federal workplace laws but do not otherwise
qualify for relief under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000 should qualify for the equitable use of prosecutorial discretion.
Second, unauthorized workers who have received certifications from other
executive agencies that they qualify as the victims of workplace crimes
should be able to estop their prosecution or removal. Ensuring the equitable
enforcement of workplace laws complies with congressional intent and
serves the public interest in safe and fair workplaces.
Finally, while this article has focused on a particular context—that of
unauthorized workers caught between two federal agencies—executive es-
toppel has broader application and can provide solutions for other individu-
als or entities facing a similar tug-of-war. It could provide a means for
whistleblowers who come forward to one federal agency to report their em-
ployers for violating federal law to estop their prosecution by another
agency. Executive estoppel could also apply when an individual or entity
receives directives from one federal agency to comply with a contract but
faces fines or the loss of a contract from another federal agency because
those directives conflict with the second agency’s policies. Given the preva-
lence of the administrative state and the degree to which agency decisions to
protect or prosecute impact individual citizens and entities, executive estop-
pel and the equitable use of prosecutorial discretion will serve as an impor-
tant check on any abuses.
